This symposium contribution discusses some issues of ontology involved in the metaethics of Hilary Putnam's book Ethics without Ontology.
. But the criticism is so sweeping that the book might not only be entitled, as Peter van Inwagen suggested, "Everything without Ontology" (2005, 11) , but "Everything without Metaphysics." However is this so clear? In what follows, I shall advance some reasons why it might not be so: reasons which have to do, of course, with the fact (emphasized by Peirce, but first of all by Aristotle) that any project of getting rid of all metaphysics is from the start doomed to failure, since "everyman of us has a metaphysics," and "becomes more or less imbued with philosophical opinions, without being clearly aware of it" (1931-58, vol. 1, §134) . But there are further reasons which may have to do with the implicit metaphysics which is at the heart of Putnam's own interpretation and consequent rejection of ontology.
It is important to note that Putnam's aim, in this book, is not primarily a strategy of destruction (to cure a "disease") but of positive "replacement." Putnam always dismissed hand-waving strategies, considering that "the true task of philosophy ... is not to rest frozen in a gesture of repudiation that is as empty as what it repudiates" (2002, 101). As a "strategic optimist," a man of the Enlightenment, his aim it to give up the vehicle, while retaining the philosophical insights (2004, 18, 85) , so as to replace a dead and stinking corpse (linked to the view, in particular, that such terms as "object" or "exist" have a unique and determinate meaning) by something alive, i.e. pragmatic pluralism, defined as "the recognition that it is no accident that in everyday language we employ many different kinds of discourse, discourses subject to different standards and possessing different sorts of applications, with different logical and grammatical features." But Putnam's aim is even wider: in keeping with his ongoing stress (see 1978) on the impossible demarcation between epistemology and ethics and, in general, between scientific and "non scientific" knowledge, he insists on the relatedness of the issues in the philosophy of mathematics and in ethics, clearly aspiring to an integrated (should we say architectonic?) vision of philosophy, eager to "take the ways of thinking that are indispensable in everyday life much more seriously than the onto-theological tradition has been willing to do," hence, in so far as ethics is defined as "being concerned with the solution of practical problems," having ethics at its core (2004, 32) .
With such a wide aim, the therapy itself should be wide enough. Indeed, metaphysical attempts of all sorts are being condemned. First, the inflationists, with their systems of substantive, necessary, established, infallible, cast in marble principles, on which criticism, experimentation, inquiry -which are yet so decisive, when we walk on "swampy ground" (2002, 102; 1995) and use "wobbling tables" (2004, 28) -seem ineffective. They postulate mysterious, invisible, supersensible, or supernatural forms which we would have a special intuition of and which would be required behind our language games to determine such things as ethical value and obligation, what the Good life is, what Justice really is. We must get rid of such "Platonizing"; conceive reason not as "a transcendent metaphysical faculty" but rather as "what is and what is nor reasonable given the concerns of the ethical life" (2004, 71) ; reject the idea of a
